Abstract. We define the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs having mild discontinuities, which in applications typically stem from how ties are resolved. For games in this class we establish sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game and minimax or Nash equilibrium strategies for the players. We prove first that if all discontinuities favor one player then a value exists and that player has a minimax strategy. Then we establish that a general property called payoff approachability implies that the value results from an equilibrium. We prove further that this property implies that every modification of the discontinuities yields the same value; in particular, for every modification, epsilon-equilibria exist.
Introduction
Following Downs [5] , studies of elections often use models in which two candidates compete for votes via the policies they propose. Each candidate's sole objective is to obtain a majority of votes, where each voter will cast her vote for the candidate whose policy she prefers. Because only one candidate can win a majority of votes, such models induce zero-sum games between the candidates. However, because outcomes depend on how voters resolve ties between candidates' policies, the candidates' payoffs are discontinuous functions of their policies. A major hindrance to studies of such models has been a lack of sufficient conditions for existence of a value of the game, and existence of minimax or equilibrium strategies for the candidates. 1 Here we establish such conditions for a large class of games, and then apply them to models in which a candidate must win a weighted-or simple-majority of votes to win election. Section 2 defines the class of two-player zero-sum games with payoffs with mild discontinuities, as specified by Assumption 2.1, and establishes two general existence theorems.
2 Section 3 and 4 apply these theorems to voting games in which the winner is determined by majority rule. These games typically have mild discontinuities at strategy profiles where voters indifferent between the policies proposed by the candidates are pivotal in determining the outcome of the election. The general results in Section 2 consider two cases. First we show that if discontinuities invariably favor one player then a value exists and that player has a minimax strategy that assures him at least the value for any strategy of his opponent. This case arises in applications when one candidate wins all ties among voters. Next we identify a general property called payoff approachability that implies the condition called 'better-reply security' by Reny [14] . This condition implies that the players have equilibrium strategies that yield the value. Moreover, we show that in games satisfying payoff approachability this remains the value for every modification of payoffs at discontinuities.
In the applications to models of elections, therefore, we show that the value exists and is independent of tie-breaking rules by verifying that payoff approachability is satisfied by a particular rule that is convenient for the verification. In several cases this is not the standard tie-breaking rule that resolves each tie by tossing a fair coin. Nevertheless, this method suffices to obtain the general result-for every tie-breaking rule, the value exists, and therefore, for every ε > 0, each candidate has a strategy that assures a payoff within ε of the value, and an ε-equilibrium exists.
Section 3 applies these results to models of elections. If one candidate wins all ties then the value exists and that candidate has a minimax strategy. For another tie-breaking rule that is symmetric, we identify assumptions on voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff 1 In a two-player zero-sum game, minimax and maximin payoffs are defined in terms of infimum and supremum operators applied to a player's payoffs, and when these two payoffs are the same the game is said to have a (unique) value. If equilibrium strategies exist then the value is player 1's equilibrium payoff. A maximin strategy for player 1 is a strategy that assures him at least the value, and a minimax strategy for player 2 is one that holds player 1's payoff down to the value. More generally, whenever the value exists each player has an ε-optimal strategy for every ε > 0, and a profile of these strategies is an ε-equilibrium. 2 Other than Dasgupta and Maskin [3] and Parthasarathy [12] , who focus on discontinuities along wellbehaved curves with zero measure, the prior literature has not restricted the set of strategies where payoffs are discontinuous and therefore must allow for pervasive discontinuities. Although other games of economic interest, such as auctions and Bertrand-style competition between duopolists, have payoffs with mild discontinuities, we do not address them here because typically the payoffs are not zero-sum.
approachability and thus better-reply security, ensuring that the candidates have equilibrium strategies that yield the value, and any other tie-breaking rule yields the same value. These assumptions are satisfied by generic preferences if the number of voters does not exceed one plus the dimension of the space of policies.
Section 4 obtains stronger results for the special case of majority-rule 'Colonel Blotto' games, which are often used to model election campaigns and lobbying. 4 In these games a candidate's policy allocates his available resources among several constituencies, each of which votes for the candidate offering more. Initially we consider versions in which the winner is the candidate obtaining a weighted majority of votes. As in Section 3, such a game has a value when one of the candidates wins all ties, and this candidate has a minimax strategy.
To address other cases we provide a tie-breaking rule that implies payoff approachability. Applying our general results to games with this tie-breaking rule shows that the candidates have equilibrium strategies that yield the value, and games with any other tie-breaking rule inherit this value. Next we strengthen this result for the special case that the winner is the candidate obtaining a simple majority of votes. We show that the value results from an equilibrium that has zero probability of ties.
General Existence Theorems
We study two-player zero-sum games with the following general features. In each game, the two players are labeled by i = 1 and 2. Given a player i, let j be the other player. For each player i, his set X i of pure strategies is a compact metric space and his set Σ i of mixed strategies is the set of Borel probability measures on X i endowed with the weak- * topology.
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Since X i is a compact metric space, so is Σ i . Let δ x i ∈ Σ i denote the point mass on x i ∈ X i .
Let X = X 1 × X 2 and Σ = Σ 1 × Σ 2 denote the sets of profiles of players' pure and mixed strategies. Player i's payoff function from pure strategies is π i : X → [−1, +1], where π 1 + π 2 = 0, and it is extended to the expected payoff from mixed strategies via π i (σ 1 , σ 2 ) = E σ 1 ,σ 2 [π i (x 1 , x 2 )] for each profile (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ. 6 Recall that when (σ n 1 , σ n 2 ) → (σ 1 , σ 2 ), the 4 The moniker Colonel Blotto stems from the paper by Gross and Wagner [9] , but studies of such games date to work in 1921 by Borel; cf. Borel [2] . Most analyses of such games assume that each player's objective is to maximize the number of votes won, as in Roberson [15] , rather than winning a majority of votes as assumed here. 5 It is sufficient that the strategy sets be compact Hausdorff spaces. Metrizability is assumed to simplify the exposition of the proofs by allowing us to use sequences rather than nets. See Remark 2.10(5) for more on this.
6 Of course, the restriction to [−1, +1] as the range is without loss. All that we require is that each π i is bounded. But even this is unnecessary, since in the unbounded case the transformation
1+e π i yields a bounded payoff function with range [−1, +1], with the convention that if the value is ±1 after the transformation then it is ±∞ in the original version.
corresponding product measure σ
s.c., and l.s.c. if f is l.s.c.
Let D ⊂ X be the subset consisting of those pure-strategy profiles at which π 1 and π 2 are discontinuous. We focus on games for which D is not empty, although we do not assume it explicitly. For each player i and his pure strategy x i ∈ X i , let D(x i ) ⊂ X j be the crosssection of D at x i , i.e. the set of x j such that (x i , x j ) ∈ D. Say that a pure strategy x i ∈ X i of player i is a point of continuity against the other player j's mixed strategy σ j ∈ Σ j if σ j assigns zero probability to the cross section D(x i ). At such a pair of strategies, player i's expected payoff π i (x i , σ j ) is independent of how payoffs are determined at profiles in D(x i ). The phrase "point of continuity" is justified by Lemma 2.3 below. The class of games with mild discontinuities consists of those that satisfy the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1 (Mild Discontinuities).
(1) The set D of pure-strategy profiles at which payoffs are discontinuous is closed.
Conditions (1) and (3) of Assumption 2.1 are relatively easy to check, as we show in the examples studied later. The following sufficient condition for Assumption 2.1(2), which is satisfied in many typical games, is also readily verifiable. We consider a basic game and the corresponding family of games that differ only in their payoffs at profiles in D, which in applications correspond to the possible resolutions of ties. Represent the basic game as G(π) where π 1 = π and π 2 = −π. Variants of this basic game are parameterized by the set Π of payoff functions π
for all x / ∈ D. Thus the family of games is {G(π 
Proof. Let π
, so the above inequalities are equalities, and the lemma follows.
For each payoff function π ′ ∈ Π, player 1's maximin and minimax values are 
In applications these correspond to the two cases that one player wins all ties. The following theorem establishes existence of values for these games. 8 Definition 2.6 (Payoff Approachability). A payoff functionπ ∈ Π is said to satisfy payoff approachability if for each player i, his pure strategy x i ∈ X i , and the other's mixed strategy
Theorem 2.4. If π
where the supremum is over all sequences {x n i } ⊂ X i converging to x i for which each pure strategy x n i in the sequence is a point of continuity against σ j .
Payoff-approachability requires that a player's payoff cannot be more than the limit of what he can get from nearby points of continuity against any strategy of his opponent. 9 In the applications to voting games we specify tie-breaking rules and assumptions on voters' preferences sufficient to imply payoff approachability.
Theorem 2.7.
If there exists a payoff functionπ ∈ Π satisfying payoff approachability then:
(1) G(π) has an equilibrium that yields the value v * (π).
exists and is the same as v * (π). 8 Observe that for any payoff function π
. Payoff-approachability ensures this last equality. 9 We use the name payoff approachability to distinguish it from Blackwell's [1] definition for repeated games of approachability of a subset of the players' pairs of possible long-run average payoffs, which requires that for some mixed strategy of one player and any mixed strategy of the other player, eventually the resulting sequence of time-average payoffs is arbitrarily close to the set with arbitrarily high probability. The restriction to nearby points that are points of continuity against σ j implies that we could have used π n instead ofπ n in the right-hand side of the above inequality. 
Proof
Since the strategy sets Σ n i converge to Σ, for all large n, there exists a strategy τ
, and thus 
2 is an optimal strategy for player 2 in G(π). Likewise, σ * 1 is optimal for player 1. Hence σ * is a Nash equilibrium of G(π).
Now we conclude the proof of the other parts of the theorem. We show that player 2 has a strategy as specified in part (2) From Lemma 2.9 we know that v 
, as was to be shown.
Remark 2.10.
(1) Although part (3) establishes that if some payoff functionπ ∈ Π satisfies payoff approachability then for every
need not be that in G(π ′ ) a player has a minimax strategy, or if he does then it could depend on the tie-breaking rule; see Remark 4.5 below for an example. Nevertheless, the above proof establishes that for each ε > 0 player 1 has a strategy that assures at least v * (π ′ ) − ε regardless of the tie-breaking rule.
Even if no payoff function in Π satisfies payoff approachability, it is still possible that for every payoff function π ′ ∈ Π the game G(π ′ ) has an equilibrium and a value, but the value depends on the tie-breaking rule. An example is the "diagonal game" at the end of Section 2.3 below. (2) Observe that by Lemma 2.9 the strategy profile σ * constructed in the second part of the proof of Theorem 2.7 by invoking Lemma 2.9 is actually an equilibrium of G(π). Thus part (1) can be viewed as a corollary to this part.
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(3) In some applications, some strategies may be (weakly) dominated and payoff approachability seems irrelevant for these profiles. The hypothesis of Theorem 2.7 can be weakened as follows. Suppose each player i has a compact subset
Then for the conclusion of Theorem 2.7 to hold it is sufficient that payoff approachability holds for all x i ∈ X * i for each i. 11 Obtaining part (1) thus as a corollary of Lemma 2.9 relies only on perturbation methods. We present the proof of part (1) separately, using better-reply security, to relate our results to previous literature on existence of equilibria in discontinuous games.
(4) If payoff approachability holds just for just one player i, in the sense that it holds for all (x i , σ j ) for fixed i and j, then the game has a value and player j has a minimax strategy. For instance, this happens in the games π + for i = 2 and π − for i = 1.
(5) If we had simply assumed that each X i is a compact Hausdorff space then we could not have used the sequenceΣ From Lemma 2.9 we obtain the following corollary about finite approximations. Recall that every two-player zero-sum game with finite sets of pure strategies has a value obtained from equilibrium strategies that can be computed by linear programming. 
We conclude this subsection with a sufficient condition for a payoff functionπ to satisfy payoff approachability. The simplification achieved by this result is that in a class of games, which includes our subsequent applications, it is enough to check whether payoff approachability holds against mixed strategies with finite support. More precisely, if a payoff function satisfies condition (1) of Proposition 2.12 below, then payoff approachability is equivalent to condition (2).
Proposition 2.12.
A payoff functionπ ∈ Π satisfies payoff approachability if: Proof. Suppose that the conditions of the theorem are satisfied by a payoff functionπ. We show thatπ satisfies payoff approachability. Fix (x i , σ j ). We can decompose σ j into an average of two strategies, σ Fix
Let τ j be the conditional distribution over A. It is sufficient to find a point
, which proves the result.
Pick a point x l j in each A l and define a mixed strategyτ j as follows:
The strategyτ j has finite support by construction and also becauseπ i (
for an open and dense set of
Becauseỹ i is a point of continuity againstτ j and using condition (1b) and Assumption 2.1(3) for σ j , there exists a point
Assembling these inequalities and equalities,
which completes the proof. 
The set D is the diagonal x 1 = x 2 , and this is the π + version, where player 1 gets +1 on D. Consider the profile (δ 1/2 , δ 1/2 ) with associated profile of payoff limits (1/2, −1/2). It is not an equilibrium, as player 2 gets −1 and could get −1/2 by any x 2 ̸ = 1/2. Better-reply security fails: If σ 1 is a strategy of player 1, we can choose a point x 2 (ε) in the interval (1/2 − ε, 1/2) that is a point of continuity against σ 1 . It is easily checked that player 1's payoff is less than 1/2 + ε from the profile (σ 1 , x 2 (ε)). Likewise, against δ 1/2 , player 2 gets
Thus no strategy of either player can secure strictly more than the corresponding payoff limit. Yet Theorem 2.4 establishes existence of a value and of a minimax strategy for player 1. (It is directly verified that the value of the game is 1/2, σ 1 = δ 1/2 is a minimax strategy for player 1, and (σ 1 , σ 2 ), with σ 1 = δ 1/2 and σ 2 = (1/2)δ 0 + (1/2)δ 1 , is an equilibrium.) See Section 4 for another example.
On the other hand, the direction taken by Theorem 2.7 is evidently a specialization of better-reply security. To illustrate, first note that its proof fails in the standard example of a zero-sum game without a value due to Sion and Wolfe [18] . This is so because this game violates payoff approachability. To see this formally, recall that in that game, there are two players, with strategy sets
If we take x 1 = 0 and
, σ 2 ) = −1 when we take a sequence of points of continuity. A similar situation holds for x 1 = 1 = σ 2 . The fundamental problem is that these are boundary points for player 1 and one can approach such a point from only one side.
By the same logic, there is no payoff functionπ ∈ Π satisfying payoff approachability. In fact, payoff approachability forcesπ 1 (1, 1) = −1, as π 1 (x n 1 , 1) = −1 for all sequences x n 1 → 1, and also −π 1 (1, 1) =π 2 (1, 1) = −1, as π 2 (1, x n 2 ) = −1 for all sequences x n 2 → 1. This applies even to the better-reply secure "diagonal game" for which π 1 equals to −1 if x 2 > x 1 , 1 if x 1 > x 2 , and 0 if x 1 = x 2 . More generally, such a game has a pure-strategy equilibrium (
Because the value v depends on the tie-breaking rule that specifies v, there cannot exist a payoff functionπ ∈ Π satisfying payoff approachability.
Models of Elections
In this section we address models of elections, as in Downs [5] . Each candidate proposes a policy and gets votes from those voters who prefer his policy to the policy proposed by the other candidate. First we apply Theorem 2.4 to conclude that if one candidate, say the incumbent, wins all ties then a value exists and the incumbent has a minimax strategy that ensures this value. Then, invoking assumptions on voters' preferences, we show that payoff approachability is satisfied for a specified tie-breaking rule. Therefore, Theorem 2.7 implies existence of an equilibrium that yields the value, and this is also the value for any other tie-breaking rule (so there exists an ε-equilibrium for every ε > 0). 12 3.1. Formulation. The game G is specified as follows. Two candidates compete in an election for the votes of K voters, where K > 2, by choosing a policy from a set P of feasible policies. Specifically, each candidate i's set X i of feasible policies is a subset of P and X = X 1 ×X 2 .
13 Each voter presumably votes for the candidate whose policy she prefers.
If voter k chooses candidate i then i gets w k votes, where each 0 < w k < 1/2 and ∑ k w k = 1. A candidate who gets more than half the votes wins the election and receives the payoff +1, and the loser receives the payoff −1. In the case of a draw, in which the candidates get equal numbers of votes, their payoffs are both zero. As in Section 2, the payoff function of candidate i is π i : X → [−1, +1], which can depend on how voters choose between tied policies.
We represent voter k's preferences by a utility function u k : P → R. We impose the following assumptions on the policy space and the preferences of voters.
Assumption 3.1 (Basic Assumptions).
(1) The policy space P is (homeomorphic to) a compact subset of a Euclidean space such that it is the closure of its interior, and for each candidate i, his set X i of feasible pure strategies is the closure of an open subset of P . (2) Each voter's utility function is continuous, and each indifference curve has zero Lebesgue measure in P .
Lemma 3.2. The game G satisfies Assumption 2.1.
Proof. The set D of points of discontinuity is the set of strategy profiles (
for each candidate i, with the inequality being strict for at least one i. This set is obviously closed in X, so Assumption 2.1(1) is satisfied. For each policy x i , the cross-section D(x i ) of D is contained in the intersection of X j with a finite union of indifference sets in P , one for each voter, each of which is a closed set of Lebesgue measure zero in P , so Assumption 2.1(2) is satisfied using Lemma 2.2. For any given mixed strategy σ j , the marginal distribution on the utility values of voter k has at most countably many 12 Plott [13] shows that an equilibrium in pure strategies exists only if voters have highly non-generic utility functions. Duggan [6] shows that an equilibrium exists in the case of three voters and the standard tie-breaking rule. Duggan and Jackson [8] show that an equilibrium exists under more general assumptions, but they rely on endogenous tie-breaking as in Simon and Zame [17] . 13 Typically, symmetry is imposed in such models by assuming that X 1 = X 2 , but our results do not require this assumption. We apply this more general formulation to asymmetric Colonel Blotto games in Section 4.
atoms. Because each indifference curve is closed and has Lebesgue measure zero in P , the set of policies of candidate i that are not points of continuity against σ j is contained in the intersection of X i with a countable union of closed sets of measure zero. Therefore Assumption 2.1(3) is satisfied.
3.2. The Case That One Candidate Wins All Ties. Theorem 2.4 implies that if one candidate wins all ties then a value exists and that candidate has a minimax strategy that ensures at least the value.
3.3. Existence of an Equilibrium. Now we provide assumptions on voters' preferences and their strategy sets, and a tie-breaking rule, that imply payoff approachability and thus the existence of an equilibrium.
Our first assumption assures a unique winner when there are no ties; see Remark 3.11 for why this assumption matters. For simple majority games, this assumption (which would say that the number of voters is odd) can be omitted; see the next subsection.
Say that a subset of voters L is a minimal subset of voters for whom x i is Pareto optimal if: (i) x i is Pareto optimal for voters in L among the policies in X i ; and (ii) there does not exist a strict subset of L for whom it is Pareto optimal. For each policy x i ∈ X i , let K(x i ) be the set of voters for whom x i is an ideal policy in X i , i.e. x i maximizes u k over X i . Obviously each voter in K(x i ) is a singleton minimal set for whom x i is optimal among policies in X i .
Assumption 3.4 (Diversity of Preferences). For each candidate i and policy
(1) The policy x i is Pareto optimal in X i . 14 (2) For each minimal subset L of voters for whom the policy x i is Pareto optimal, each voter k ∈ L, and each neighborhood V of x i , there exists a policy
Observe that there exists at most one minimal subset L of K \K(x i ) for whom x i is Pareto optimal if the assumption is satisfied. Moreover there exists one iff K(x i ) is empty. Thus define K * (x i ) to be K(x i ) if the latter is nonempty and otherwise the unique minimal subset L of K for which x i is optimal.
15
14 See Remark 3.10 for a discussion of how to relax this assumption. 15 If we had assumed that the ideal policies of voters are all different, then each x i has a unique minimal subset of voters for whom x i is Pareto optimal. We do not impose this assumption because models with linear preferences over a convex set could admit the robust possibility that the same policy is ideal for multiple voters.
Given a policy x i ∈ X i , for every neighborhood V (x i ) of x i , and every k ∈ K * (x i ), from Assumption 3.4 we can choose a policy
To simplify notation, we will use y
and
For all sufficiently small neighborhoods V (x i ) of x i , for each
Observe that by construction the payoffs are then well-defined without ties for (y loses for the tied voter in l * i (x) with the least vote and wins for all other tied voters, and yet it loses to x j , so candidate j needs just one of the tied voters to win the election. And, for each k ∈ K * (x j ), it is simple to find a y k j that achieves that much, given that Assumption 3.4 holds. So Assumption 3.5 holds as well.
The following example illustrates the ideas involved. Consider x ∈ D given by x i = (1/4, 1/4, 0) and
loses voter 1 (because l * i (x) = {1}), wins voter 3 and does not change the other two voters (relative to x j -so 2 still prefers i's policy y l * i (x) i over x j , whereas 4 prefers
). Given the weights specified above, y
loses to x j , as it gets .2 + .29 = .49 votes, whereas x j gets .51 votes. To illustrate Assumption 3.5, we must show that y k j beats x i for k = 1, 3, 4. It is obvious for k = 4, as u 4 (x j ) > u 4 (x i ), V (x j ) is chosen so that this inequality is preserved for all y j ∈ V (x j ), and y The tie-breaking rule is specified in terms of the implied payoff functionπ ∈ Π. 
In all other cases,π i (x i , x j ) = 0 for each candidate i. 16 As above, when y
loses to x j , candidate j is in a very advantageous situation. For instance, at the pair (x i , x j ) described in Example 3.6, candidate j has .4 votes already, and capturing any of the two tied voters (1 and 3) would suffice for j to win the election, whereas candidate i has to get the votes from both voters 1 and 3 to win the election. In such situations, the tie-breaking rule T awards the election to j. This tie-breaking rule has the following convenient property.
Lemma 3.8. The payoff functionπ induced by rule T satisfies condition (1) of Proposition 2.12.
Proof. We can partition D(x i ) into a finite number of subsets, each indexed by a triple 
is constant on A L for an open and dense subset of V , i.e. those y i 's for which
for all k ∈ L 0 , which verifies condition (1b).
Theorem 3.9. The game G(π) has an equilibrium and its value is the same as the value of
Proof. We check thatπ satisfies payoff approachability for an arbitrary profile (x i , σ j ) and then apply Theorem 2.7. By the above lemma and Proposition 2.12, we can assume that σ j has finite support, say x 
. By our choice ofε, V (x i ) is one of the neighborhoods that could be used in defining the tie-breaking rule. (In particular, for each k there are no ties between y k i and the x l j 's and the former is a point of continuity against σ j .) We show that there exists some k such thatπ i (y k i , σ j ) π i (x i , σ j ), which proves payoff approachability. 16 We could also use fair coin tosses for each tied voter.
resolves the ties in favor of j. Therefore, if (T 1) applies to every x l j then we are done. Otherwise, letX j be the set of x j such that (T 2) applies to (x i , x j ) and letσ j be the conditional distribution overX j . We now show that there exists k such thatπ i (y 
is nonempty, this is true since otherwise (T 1) applies. Therefore, we are done in this case.
has at least two voters, then tooπ i (y i , x j ) = +1, since (T 1) would apply otherwise. Thus among the policies inX j , y i beats every x l j except, possibly, the subsetÂ j of those x j 's inX j for which L * i (x i , x j ) is just the singleton k * . If the probability of this subset underσ j is no more than half, thenπ i (y i ,σ j ) 0 and we are done.
Finally, suppose that the probability ofÂ j underσ j is greater than half. Observe that K * (x i ) contains some other voter, sayk, since we have assumed that K(x i ) is empty. As we argued above, for any k ∈ K * (x i ), y k i beats any x j that x i beats under (T 1) and does at least as well when x i loses because of (T 1). On the setX j we now have that y i (V (x i ),k) beats every policy inÂ j , which has a probability at least half, and thus it gets a weakly higher payoff againstσ j than x i , which completes the proof. Remark 3.10. Suppose X i includes policies that are not optimal in X i . Let X * i be the set of optimal policies in X i . If our assumptions hold on the sets X * i then our results apply to obtain existence of a value over X * 1 × X * 2 . We could specify payoffs at ties involving non-optimal points to extend this to an equilibrium over the bigger strategy space. But even simpler, the game over X inherits the value from the game over X * : for each ε, our perturbation technique yields for each player i an ε-optimal strategy σ ε i that assigns zero probability to any voter's indifference curves-indeed, this follows if we use for the restricted strategy sets, the sets identified by the proof of Lemma 2.2 which have the property that each element of these sets assigns zero probability to cross-sections. The same strategy is ε-optimal in X.
Remark 3.11.
A key feature of the tie-breaking rule T is (T 1). When it is invoked to resolve a tie between x i and x j , it ensures that each player can achieve the payoff from the tie by all choices of the form y 
Payoffapproachability is violated at the profile where both candidates offer the policy that yields o 1 for sure. However, that profile is an equilibrium.
Simple-Majority Games.
For the case of simple-majority games we specify a slightly different tie-breaking rule that implies the same result even if the number of voters is even. We use the notation from the previous section, except that each w k = 1/K.
Obviously, Assumption 3.3 cannot hold when the number of voters is even, so it is dropped. Assumption 3.4 on diversity of preferences remains the same. Assumption 3.5 relating strategy sets has to be changed. In the following assumption and definition, we retain the notation from the previous subsection. 
Example 3.14. In the setting of Example 3.6, set the weights to w k = 1/4 for every k.
Condition (1) Again, the tie-breaking rule is specified in terms of the implied payoff functionπ ∈ Π. (T 1) For each i, let V (x i ) be as in Assumption 3.13. Suppose for some i, L * i (x) is nonempty and L 0 (x) has at least two voters. For this i:
In all other cases,π i (x i , x j ) = 0 for each i. 17 The rule T S differs from the rule T used in the previous subsection only in that provisions (T 1)(a) and (T 2) are added-and the condition that L * i (x) has at least two voters if L i (x) is empty, when invoking (T 1), is relaxed-to accommodate the fact that with an even number of voters the game could end in a draw. Without these changes, T S is the same as T .
From Example 3.16 we see that provision (T 1)(b) is analogous to provision (T 1) of tiebreaking rule T : candidate j is in a very advantageous situation whenπ i (y
, as winning a single one of the tied voters guarantees a victory, whereas candidate i has to win all of the tied voters. In such a situation, T S awards the election to j. Provision (T 1)(a) handles draws: from Example 3.14, we see that
is a symmetric situation, so the rule T S declares it a draw; from Example 3.15
we see that candidate j is in an advantageous situation when π i (y
, as j has the upper hand in the non-tied battles, so T S awards the election to j.
Example 3.18.
Return to the setting of Example 3.14. Consider the pair (x i , x j ) with x i = (0, 0, 0) and x j in the intersection of 1's indifference surface and the face spanned by voters 1, 2 and 4, in such a way that voter 4 prefers x j to x i (for instance, x j = (
, so the premise of condition (T 2) of the rule T S applies, and the rule then says thatπ i (x i , x j ) = −1/2. We see that candidate j is in a stronger position because he has already secured 2/4 votes. But y 1 j loses voter 1, so it fails to beat x i . The relatively stronger position of candidate j is then captured by awarding the election to him with probability 3/4 rather than 1/2.
The tie-breaking rule T S also satisfies payoff approachability. To prove this, as in Subsection 3.3, it is easy to show that the payoff functionπ satisfies condition 1 of Proposition 2.12 and thus it is sufficient to show that payoff approachability is satisfied by (x i , σ j ) where σ j has finite support in D(x i ). This property is verified by Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. Hence,π satisfies payoff approachability and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.19. The game G(π) has an equilibrium and its value is the value of every variant
G(π ′ ) with π ′ ∈ Π.
Majority Games of Resource Allocation
This section addresses a special case of the formulation and results in Sections 2 and 3. The two players compete for votes in several constituencies, called battlegrounds. The winner of the game is again the player who wins more votes. The key feature now is that a player wins a battle if he allocates more of his available resources to that battle than his opponent does. Thus the game is a majority-rule version of a Colonel Blotto game. 18 4.1. Formulation. The game G is a weighted-majority game specified as follows. Each player i has an amount R i of a resource that he allocates among the battles. Assume that R 1 R 2 > 0 and that the number of battles is an integer K > 2. A pure strategy x i = (x i,k ) k=1,...,K for player i allocates a nonnegative amount x i,k of his resource to battle k. Thus his set of pure strategies is
For each battle k, the winner of the battle obtains w k votes, where 0 < w k < 1/2 and ∑ k w k = 1. We assume that
for each subset L of K, except when we consider simple-majority games.
19 Player i wins the game and gets payoff +1 if ∑ This model is a special case of those in Section 3. The policy space P is the union of X 1 and X 2 . Each battleground represents a voter whose utility function is u k (x i ) = x i,k .
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The following theorem extends a result obtained by Duggan [7] , who proves existence of an equilibrium for simple-majority rule with symmetric resources and the standard tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 4.1. If the tie-breaking rule is T (or T
S in the case of simple majority) then the game has an equilibrium that yields the value, and any other tie-breaking rule yields the same value.
Proof. We verify the assumptions stated in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 and apply Theorems 3.9 and 3.19, respectively. Assumption 3.3 is stated in the formulation. To check the other assumptions, remark first that K * (x i ) is the set of battles whose coordinates are positive.
In particular, K(x i ) is a singleton for a vertex (the voter corresponding to the battlefield getting all the resources) and empty elsewhere. With this feature, Assumption 3.4 is easily verified. In fact, for each coordinate that is positive, we can reduce it by an arbitrarily small amount and assign a strictly higher amount to all other battlefields. Regarding Assumption 3. 
Remark 4.2.
We need something stronger than the standard rule if payoff approachability is to hold. To see the problems with the standard rule, suppose K = 3, we have simple majority rule, R 1 > R 2 , i = 2, and x i allocates zero resources to the first battle and R 2 /2 to each of the other two. Suppose x j is the pure strategy of player j = 1 that allocates a positive amount to the first battle and ties with player i on the other two battles. Then using tosses of a fair coin for each of the ties gives player i a probability 1/4 of winning. Every nearby strategy loses.
Existence of an Equilibrium With Zero Probability of Ties.
The results above can be strengthened for simple-majority games. For this class of games we use the existence result from Section 3.4, under the tie-breaking rule T S .
Permutations of the battles induce a symmetry group, and therefore among the equilibria there are some that inherit the symmetries of the game. We show that these equilibria have zero probability of ties except for a single critical value of R 1 /R 2 .
Assume that w k = 1/K for all k, so that G is a simple-majority game. Thus a player winning 1 + ⌊K/2⌋ battles wins the game.
22 Let r * = K/⌈K/2⌉. Diermeier and Myerson [4] call r * the hurdle factor and prove the following. 
Sketch of Proof.
The pure strategy of player 1 that allocates his resources uniformly across all the battles wins the game against every strategy of player 2, and no ties occur that could affect whether player 1 wins.
In the most relevant case that R 1 /R 2 is strictly below the hurdle factor, there exists an equilibrium in which the tie-breaking rule is invoked with zero probability, as we now verify.
Because the game G uses a simple majority to decide the winner, it treats battles symmetrically. if R 1 = R 2 . To see this, apply the perturbation method in the proof of Theorem 2.7 but now choosing the strategy sets to be symmetric with respect to the battlefields and perturbing the strategies of both players simultaneously. These perturbed games have an equilibrium that is invariant under all the symmetries of the game and hence the limit of these equilibria as the perturbations shrink inherit the same properties. The following result, proved in the Appendix, shows that ties occur with zero probability in equilibrium.
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Theorem 4.
That is, at the equilibrium σ * the probability is zero that the tie-breaking rule T S is invoked.
Remark 4.5. In the knife-edge case that R 1 /R 2 is exactly equal to the hurdle factor r * , ties can occur in an equilibrium, and minimax strategies can depend on the tie-breaking rule.
The uniform strategy described in the proof of Proposition 4.3 continues to be a minimax strategy of player 1 under rule T , or if he wins all ties then again he can assure the value +1. But player 1 does not have a minimax strategy if the tie-breaking rule is the standard rule that tosses a fair coin to resolve each tied battle. For simplicity, we illustrate the case K = 3, R 1 = 3/2, R 2 = 1, and r * = 3/2. Let π be the expected payoff function induced by the standard rule. As argued above, because of the symmetry of the battles, if player 1 has a minimax strategy then he has one that is invariant under all permutations of the coordinates. Thus fix a strategyσ 1 that is invariant under the symmetries of the game. For each x i , denote the rank order by (
Observe that the probability of x 
Combining the two bounds, we must have inf
24 Zero probability of ties does not imply irrelevance of the tie-breaking rule, since it still has a role in deterring deviations from the equilibrium strategies. We conjecture (at least in the symmetric case where both candidates have equal resources, but possibly also more generally except for a single critical ratio of resources) that the game has an equilibrium that remains an equilibrium for every tie-breaking rule.
Theorem 4.1 above ensures that the game has a value, and the value is independent of the tie-breaking rule. Because the value of the game with payoff function π + is +1 (the minimax strategy for player 1 assigns 1/2 to each battlefield), the value of the game with payoff function π is +1. So a minimax strategyσ 1 for player 1 must satisfy inf x 2 ∈X 2 π 1 (σ 1 , x 2 ) = +1. But this requires that α and β(b) are zero for every b, which is impossible. So player 1 does not have a minimax strategy, and a Nash equilibrium cannot exist. Note that this implies that the game with payoff function π violates better-reply security even though the value exists.
Concluding Remarks
The absence of general theorems establishing existence of values, minimax strategies, and equilibria of zero-sum majority games has long impeded applications to electoral competition and redistributive politics. In studies of elections, reliance on one-dimensional policy spaces has limited the relevance to practical affairs. In studies of resource allocation in electoral campaigns and lobbying, the absence of general existence results has impaired conclusions about effects of asymmetries in resources available to the candidates. The technical difficulties stem from discontinuities in payoffs at ties, and therefore hinge on how ties are resolved.
Our two general results in Section 2 provide alternative tools. Theorem 2.4 shows that when all ties are resolved in favor of one player then the value exists and that player has a minimax strategy that ensures the value. This conclusion is especially useful in models of elections, where otherwise assumptions about voters' preferences are required. Theorem 2.7 shows that tie-breaking rules satisfying payoff approachability imply better-reply security and therefore equilibria exist that yield the value; and importantly, any other tie-breaking rule yields the same value, so ε-equilibria exist.
This result applies to the models of elections addressed in Section 3, where a tie-breaking rule and the assumed diversity of voters' preferences implies payoff approachability (Theorems 3.9 and 3.19). And it applies to the weighted-majority games of resource allocation addressed in Section 4, where again a particular tie-breaking rule implies payoff approachability (Theorem 4.1), and further, for simple-majority games it implies existence of an equilibrium with zero probability of ties (Theorem 4.4).
Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 4.4
We begin with a preliminary lemma about the payoff functionπ that describes the tiebreaking rule T S , introduced in Section 3.4 for simple-majority games. In this game, fix 
. This difference is equal to −1 if neither of the candidates has half of the voters outside of L 0 (x). But, observe that for every
is nonempty but each player for whom it is nonempty that he can achieve +1 rather than 0 or Coming to ties involving (T 1) it is clear now that if there is a tie with an x j where the rule is invoked because of i, then for x i to do at least as well as all y k i , we must have
If this is violated
for some x i and if x i is already not dominated by some y k i against the conditional over x j 's where (T 1) is not used, then K * (x) has two coordinates and as we argued at the end of the last paragraph each k would do equally well against those not involving (T 1), with the result that it would do strictly better against σ j , proving point (4).
We now recall and prove Theorem 4.4 for simple-majority Colonel-Blotto games.
Theorem 4.4. Let σ * be an equilibrium that is invariant under all the symmetries of the
2 )(D) = 0, that is, at the equilibrium σ * the tie-breaking rule T S has zero probability of being invoked.
We set up some notation and prove a number of preliminary claims before proving the theorem. Suppose x i is a strategy in X i such that σ , where the former puts zero probability on X j \ D(x i ) and the latter puts probability one on it. Let L(x i ) be the set of quadruples
that there is a positive probability under σ * j of the set D L (x i ) consisting of x j 's such that
) and provision (T n) of rule T S is used, where n ∈ { 1, 2, 3 }. For simplicity, from here on we suppress T n in the notation. For each L choose a point x j (L) ∈ D L (x i ) and consider the conditional distributionσ Proof. Let x i be a strategy that assigns R i to a battle, say k = 1. Observe first that for (T 1) to be used in deciding a tie between x i and x j 's, this battle must belong to L 0 (x).
If R 1 = R 2 , this means that x i = x j and (T 3) is operative. If R 1 > R 2 , then i = 2 and π i (y 
